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Aumann (1976) derives his famous we cannot agree to disagree result under
the assumption of rational Bayesian learning. Motivated by psychological evi-
dence against this assumption, we develop formal models of optimistically, resp.
pessimistically, biased Bayesian learning within the framework of Choquet ex-
pected utility theory. As a key feature of our approach the posterior subjective
beliefs do, in general, not converge to ￿true￿probabilities. Moreover, the posteri-
ors of di⁄erent people can converge to di⁄erent beliefs even if these people receive
the same information. As our main contribution we show that people may well
agree to disagree if their Bayesian learning is psychologically biased in our sense.
Remarkably, this ￿nding holds regardless of whether people with identical priors
apply the same psychologically biased Bayesian learning rule or not. A simple
example about the possibility of ex-post trading in a ￿nancial asset illustrates our
formal ￿ndings. Finally, our analysis settles a discussion in the no-trade literature
(cf. Dow, Madrigal, and Werlang 1990, Halevy 1998) in that it clari￿es that ex-
post trade between agents with common priors and identical learning rules is only
possible under asymmetric information.
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11 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Aumann (1976) proves that ￿If two people have the same priors, and their posteriors
for an event A are common knowledge, then these posteriors are equal￿(p. 1236). This
celebrated we cannot agree to disagree result has been derived under the assumption
that people￿ s posterior beliefs result from rational Bayesian learning. However, several
studies in the psychological literature show that real-life agents systematically violate
this assumption in that their learning behavior is prone to e⁄ects such as ￿myside bias￿
or ￿irrational belief persistence￿(cf., e.g., the references in chapter 9, Baron 2007). For
example, in an early contribution to this literature, Lord, Ross, and Lepper (1979) con-
duct an experiment in which agents￿posteriors diverge despite the fact that all agents
have received the same information.1 Moreover, de￿nitions of several psychological phe-
nomenons such as delusions, depressions etc. are based on the observation that di⁄erent
subjects may interpret identical information in di⁄erent ways (cf. Beck 1976).
The contributions of this paper are two-fold. At ￿rst, we introduce in this paper
a formal model of Bayesian learning with a myside bias. More precisely, we introduce
the notion of optimistically, resp. pessimistically, biased Bayesian learning. With these
de￿nitions we formally describe the di⁄erence between ￿half empty￿versus ￿half full￿
attitudes in the context of interpreting new information. In contrast to the standard
model of rational Bayesian learning (e.g., Tonks 1983, Viscusi and O￿ Connor 1984, Vis-
cusi 1985), the posterior beliefs of biased Bayesian learning do not converge to the ￿true￿
probabilities. Furthermore, the posterior beliefs of di⁄erent agents may well converge
to di⁄erent beliefs even if these agents always receive the same information. As our
second contribution, we demonstrate that people may agree to disagree if their Bayesian
learning is psychologically biased. This result holds regardless of whether people apply
the same Bayesian learning rule or not.
Key to our analysis is the assumption that people are Choquet expected utility
(CEU) rather than expected utility (EU) decision makers. CEU theory (Schmeidler
1989, Gilboa 1987) is a generalization of EU theory that admits for the integration of a
vNM function with respect to non-additive probability measures (capacities). Properties
of such capacities are used for the formal description of ambiguity attitudes which may
explain Ellsberg (1961) paradoxes. Ellsberg paradoxes demonstrate systematic violations
1The subjects in this experiment were confronted with two purported statistical studies, one study
supporting the other study rejecting the claim that capital punishment has a crime deterrence e⁄ect.
For analogous results in the context of Bayesian updating of subjective probabilities see Pitz, Downing,
and Reinhold (1967) and Pitz (1969).
2of Savage￿ s (1954) ￿sure thing principle￿ . The sure thing principle, however, ensures
that there is a unique way of deriving ex-post preferences from ex-ante preferences,
implying a unique Bayesian update rule for the additive probabilities of subjective EU
theory. The picture is di⁄erent for the non-additive probability measures of CEU theory
for which several perceivable Bayesian update rules exist (cf. Gilboa and Schmeidler
1993, Eichberger, Grant and Kelsey 2006, Siniscalchi 2001, 2006). Following Gilboa and
Schmeidler￿ s (1993) psychological interpretation we consider the extreme cases of the
optimistic, resp. pessimistic, update rule, which we apply to non-additive probability
measures de￿ned as neo-additive capacities in the sense of Chateauneuf, Eichberger and
Grant (2006). Our resulting de￿nition of optimistically, resp. pessimistically, biased
agents combines the standard model of rational Bayesian learning with an optimistic,
resp. pessimistic, attitude towards the interpretation of new information.
We present two di⁄erent results of the type that people may agree to disagree if their
learning rules are psychologically biased. Our ￿rst result (proposition 1) shows that if
two people have the same prior, apply di⁄erent learning rules, and their posteriors for an
event A = 2 f?;￿g are common knowledge, then these posteriors will be di⁄erent even in
case they have identical information partitions. Within the appropriate framework this
result is easily derived. However, beyond the mere formal result our ￿nding addresses an
important behavioral issue. Aumann (1976) writes ￿In private conversation, Tversky has
suggested that people may also be biased because of psychological factors, that may make
them disregard information that is unpleasant or does not conform to previously formed
notions￿ (p. 1238). There is no way of describing such psychological biases of real-
life people within Aumann￿ s framework. Within our approach, however, the resulting
￿myside bias￿has a straightforward interpretation as people￿ s di⁄erent attitudes towards
the interpretation of information due to psychological predispositions such as the ￿half-
empty glass￿versus the ￿half-full glass￿attitude.
Whereas our ￿rst result applies to people who use di⁄erent rules of Bayesian learning,
our second result (proposition 2) refers to the case of identical learning rules. We ￿nd
that if two people have the same prior, apply the same learning rule, and their posteriors
for an event A = 2 f?;￿g are common knowledge, then these posteriors can be di⁄erent
in case they have di⁄erent information partitions. Thus, neither in the case where people
have the same information partitions nor in the case where people apply the same update
rule does Aumann￿ s conclusion obtain when Bayesian learning is psychologically biased
in our sense. To the contrary, according to our results a di⁄erence in posteriors that are
common knowledge is the rule rather than the exception when people are psychologically
biased.
31.2 Relationship to no-trade results
Combined with Harsanyi￿ s (1967) common priors doctrine Aumann￿ s we cannot agree
to disagree result has been very in￿ uential in information economics. Especially the
so-called no-trade theorems - basically stating that there should be no ex-post trade
in ￿nancial assets if the agents are rational - are based on Aumann￿ s approach (cf.,
e.g., Milgrom 1981, Milgrom and Stokey 1982, Samet 1990, Morris 1994, Bonanno and
Nehring 1999). The connection between Aumann￿ s we cannot agree to disagree result
and the impossibility of ex-post trade in ￿nancial assets is straightforward. Under the
assumption that agents have di⁄erent preferences for such assets if and only if they have
di⁄erent beliefs about the assets￿future returns, there are strict incentives for ex-post
trade if and only if the agents have di⁄erent posterior beliefs. Since the market-price of
such assets is common knowledge between the trading agents, any trade would result in
the traders￿common knowledge that their posteriors must be di⁄erent.2
Since no trade-results are seemingly at odds with reality, there are several contri-
butions in the literature investigating the robustness of no-trade results with respect
to a weakening of Aumann￿ s assumptions. One line of research discusses concepts of
bounded rationality that weaken the rationality assumptions of Aumann￿ s epistemic
framework. For example, information structures have been considered that are non-
partitional (Bacharach 1985, Samet 1990, Geneakoplos 1992, Rubinstein and Wolinsky
1990) or concepts of ￿almost￿common-knowledge have been introduced (Neeman 1996).
In contrast to this literature our approach fully adopts Aumann￿ s epistemic framework.
The agents of our model are boundedly rational not with respect to their logical capa-
bility but with respect to their psychological bias in interpreting new information.
Closer to our own approach is a second line of research on no-trade results that consid-
ers decision theoretic alternatives to EU theory. In an early contribution Dow, Madrigal
and Werlang (1990) already provide an example in which ex-post trading becomes pos-
sible because agents update their non-additive beliefs according to the Dempster-Shafer
rule which is at the heart of our de￿nition of pessimistically biased Bayesian learning.
Dow et al. thereby assume asymmetric information and common non-additive priors so
that their example can be regarded as an illustration of our proposition 2 for the special
case of pessimistically biased agents.
Halevy (1998, 2004) claims that the ￿nding of Dow et al. can be extended to the
case of symmetric information so that there might occur ex-post trading between agents
with common priors and identical information partitions if their beliefs are non-additive.
More precisely, Halevy writes:
2Note that the typical assumption of ￿strictly risk averse￿traders (e.g., Milgrom 1981, Milgrom and
Stokey 1982) is thus not necessary for obtaining ￿no-trade￿results.
4￿A similar result appears in Dow et al (1990). Their result, as noted by
Epstein and Le Breton (1993) and as our present example illustrates, relies
merely on dynamic inconsistency of the individual agents. Their claim that
trade is a result of asymmetric information is not accurate: we show below
that it could be reached with completely symmetric information and even
with a common prior.￿(footnote 17, p. 20 in Halevy 1998)
In the light of our propositions 1 and 2, we take a somewhat di⁄erent view from
Halevy. Namely, Dow et al.￿ s conclusion is indeed accurate under their assumption
of an identical update rule for all agents: our analysis demonstrates that agents with
an identical update rule cannot agree to disagree if they have identical information
partitions. Our own asset-trade example in section 5 of this paper therefore establishes
the existence of ex-post trade between agents with symmetric information and common
priors if and only if the agents have di⁄erent update rules. Since Halevy￿ s example
does not consider di⁄erent update rules, his ￿nding is apparently at odds with our
own results. As it turns out the di⁄erence between Dow et al. and our conclusion, on
the one hand, and Halevy￿ s conclusion, on the other hand, is due to di⁄erent notions
of common priors. Halevy￿ s example is based on Yaari￿ s (1987) dual theory in which
additive probabilities are transformed into non-additive beliefs by some transformation
function. Halevy speaks of common priors because his agents have common additive
probabilities. But since these agents apply di⁄erent transformation functions, their
resulting non-additive priors are no longer identical. According to our approach and
the approach of Dow et al. the assumption of common priors is therefore violated in
Halevy￿ s example.
Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1990, Remark p. 190) argue that Milgrom and Stokey￿ s
no-trade result applies to all decision theories under uncertainty which satisfy dynamic
consistency. Halevy (2004) reports the interesting fact that there might even be ex-post
trading between dynamically consistent agents if these agents violate consequentialism.
While EU decision makers satisfy, by the sure-thing principle, dynamic consistency as
well as consequentialism, the agents of our model only satisfy consequentialism and the
possibility of agreeing to disagree exclusively results from their dynamically inconsistent
preferences (cf. Epstein and Le Breton 1993, Sarin and Wakker 1998).
The subsequent analysis is structured as follows. In section 2 we describe our decision-
theoretic framework which we combine in section 3 with the standard model of rational
Bayesian learning. Section 4 recalls Aumann￿ s (1976) epistemic framework and presents
our ￿rst agreeing to disagree result. A simple example in section 5 about the possibility
5of ex-post asset trade illustrates this ￿rst result. Our second agreeing to disagree result
is stated and proved in section 6. Section 7 concludes.
2 Preliminaries: The decision-theoretic framework
As in Aumann (1976) we consider a measurable space (￿;B) with B denoting a ￿-algebra
on the state space ￿. As a generalization of Aumann￿ s assumption of EU decision
makers, however, we consider a CEU rather than an EU decision maker.3 In contrast
to EU theory, CEU theory admits for non-additive probability measures, i.e., capacities,
whereby a capacity ￿ : B ! [0;1] must satisfy
(i) ￿ (;) = 0, ￿ (￿) = 1
(ii) A ￿ B ) ￿ (A) ￿ ￿ (B) for all A;B 2 B:
Additional properties of capacities are used in the literature for formal de￿nitions of,
e.g., ambiguity and uncertainty attitudes (Schmeidler, 1989; Epstein, 1999; Ghirardato
and Marinacchi, 2002), pessimism and optimism (Eichberger and Kelsey, 1999; Wakker,
2001), as well as sensitivity to changes in likelihood (Wakker, 2004).
In our model of non-rational Bayesian learning we restrict attention to a class of
capacities that are de￿ned as neo-additive capacities in the sense of Chateauneuf, Eich-
berger, and Grant (2006). Neo-additive capacities stand for deviations from additive
probabilities such that a parameter ￿ (degree of ambiguity) measures the lack of con￿-
dence the decision maker has in some subjective additive probability distribution ￿. In
addition, a second parameter ￿ measures the degree of optimism versus pessimism by
which the decision maker resolves his ambiguity.
De￿nition: A neo-additive capacity, ￿, is de￿ned, for some ￿;￿ 2 [0;1], by
￿ (A) = ￿ ￿ (￿ ￿ !
o (A) + (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ !
p (A)) + (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿ (A) (1)
3CEU theory was ￿rst axiomatized by Schmeidler (1986, 1989) within the Anscombe and Aumann
(1963) framework, which assumes preferences over objective probability distributions. Subsequently,
Gilboa (1987) as well as Sarin and Wakker (1992) have presented CEU axiomizations within the Savage
(1954) framework, assuming a purely subjective notion of likelihood. CEU theory is equivalent to
cumulative prospect theory (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992; Wakker and Tversky, 1993) restricted to
the domain of gains (compare Tversky and Wakker, 1995). Moreover, as a representation of preferences
over lotteries, CEU theory coincides with rank dependent utility theory as introduced by Quiggin (1981,
1982).
6for all A 2 B such that ￿ is some additive probability measure and we have for the
non-additive capacities !o
!
o (A) = 1 if A 6= ;
!
o (A) = 0 if A = ;
and !p respectively
!
p (A) = 0 if A 6= ￿
!
p (A) = 1 if A = ￿.
Let the state space ￿ be ￿nite and denote by f (!) the outcome of the Savage-act
f in state ! 2 ￿. The Choquet expected utility of a Savage-act f with respect to a
neo-additive capacity is













with u(￿) denoting von Neumann-Morgenstern utility indices.4
In contrast to EU preferences there exist for CEU preferences several possibilities
of deriving from ex ante preferences ex post preferences, i.e., preferences conditional on
the fact that some event B has occurred. Following Gilboa and Schmeidler (1993) we
focus on so-called f-Bayesian update rules for preferences ￿ over Savage acts. That is,






for all events B,
such that for all acts g;h
g ￿
f
B h , (g;B;f;:B) ￿ (h;B;f;:B) (3)
where (g;B;f;:B) denotes the act that gives consequences g (!) for all ! 2 B and
consequences f (!) for all ! 2 :B. Gilboa and Schmeidler show that CEU preferences
4Ludwig and Zimper (2006a) show that the CEU of an act with respect to a neo-additive capacity
can be equivalently described by the ￿-maxmin expected utility with respect to multiple priors (￿-MEU)
of an act which encompasses the original multiple priors approach of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) as a
special case (see, e.g., Ghirardato et al., 1998; Ghirardato et al., 2004; Siniscalchi, 2005). In particular,
we have equivalence between the CEU with respect to neo-additive capacities and the ￿-MEU with
respect to so-called "-contaminated priors used in Bayesian statistics (Berger and Berliner, 1986) that
may be interpreted as neo-additive capacities.






for all events B if
and only if f is an act such that for some event E 2 ￿
f = (x
￿;E;x￿;:E); (4)
where x￿ denotes the best and x￿ denotes the worst consequence possible. The di⁄erent
possible speci￿cations of E in (4) can result in a multitude of di⁄erent f-Bayesian update
rules if dynamic consistency is violated. For example, for the so-called optimistic update
rule f is the constant act where E = ;. That is, under the optimistic update rule the null-
event becomes associated with the worst consequence possible. Gilboa and Schmeidler
(1993) o⁄er the following psychological motivation for this update rule:
￿[...] when comparing two actions given a certain event A, the decision maker implicitly
assumes that had A not occurred, the worst possible outcome [...] would have
resulted. In other words, the behavior given A [...] exhibits ￿ happiness￿that A
has occurred; the decisions are made as if we are always in ￿ the best of all possible
worlds￿ .￿
As corresponding optimistic Bayesian update rule for conditional beliefs of CEU
decision makers obtains
￿
opt (A j B) =
￿ (A \ B)
￿ (B)
: (5)
For the pessimistic (=Dempster-Shafer) update rule f is the constant act where
E = S, associating with the null-event the best consequence possible. Gilboa and
Schmeidler:
￿[...] we consider a ￿ pessimistic￿decision maker, whose choices reveal the hidden as-
sumption that all the impossible worlds are the best conceivable ones.￿
The corresponding pessimistic Bayesian update rule for CEU decision makers is
￿
pess (A j B) =
￿ (A [ :B) ￿ ￿ (:B)
1 ￿ ￿ (:B)
: (6)
Observation 1: Suppose A;B = 2 f?;￿g.
(i) An application of the optimistic update rule (5) to a prior belief (1) results in
the conditional belief
￿














￿ ￿ ￿ + (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿ (B)
.
(ii) An application of the pessimistic update rule (6) to a prior belief (1) results
in the conditional belief
￿
pess (A j B) = (1 ￿ ￿
pess





￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) + (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿ (B)
.
Proof: Relegated to the appendix.
Let A;B = 2 f?;￿g and observe that
￿
pess (A j B) < ￿
opt (A j B), (7)
if ￿ > 0, and
￿
pess (A j B) < ￿ (A j B) < ￿
opt (A j B)
if ￿ > 0, ￿ 2 (0;1), and ￿ (A j B) 2 (0;1). For the ex post evaluation of any Savage act
f we therefore have
CEU (f;￿
pess (A j B)) ￿ EU (f;￿ (A j B)) ￿ CEU
￿
f;￿
opt (A j B)
￿
,
whereby these inequalities are strict in non-trivial cases.
3 Psychologically biased Bayesian learning
Let us ￿rst recall the standard model of rational Bayesian learning which obtains as a
special case of our approach. Following Viscusi and O￿ Connor (1984) we consider an
agent who has a prior probability distribution over the ￿￿ parameter of a Binomial-
distribution (￿￿ being the true probability of some event A) such that this prior distri-
bution belongs to the family of Beta distributions. The agent￿ s subjective prior about
￿￿, denoted ￿, is the expected value of this prior Beta distribution, i.e., ￿ (A) = ￿
￿+￿ for
given parameters ￿ and ￿. Let ￿ (A j In) denote the agent￿ s posterior about ￿ derived
from rational Bayesian learning whereby the event In denotes information equivalent to
a statistical experiment in which event A has occurred kn-times in n independent trials.
9Rational Bayesian learning then results in a posterior Beta distribution about ￿￿ with
expected value ￿+kn
￿+￿+n implying for the posterior belief
￿ (A j In) =
￿
￿ + ￿
￿ + ￿ + n
￿
￿ ￿ (A) +
￿
n
￿ + ￿ + n
￿
￿ ￿n (8)
where ￿n denotes the sample mean kn
n . Since kn
n converges for n ! 1 in probability to
￿￿ (A), we have, for any c > 0,
lim
n!1prob(j￿ (A j In) ￿ ￿
￿ (A)j < c) = 1, (9)
which we abbreviate henceforth as
lim
n!1￿ (A j In) = ￿
￿ (A).
That is, under the assumption of rational Bayesian learning the posterior beliefs con-
verges to the true probability if the number of trials (=sample size) approaches in￿nity.5
De￿nition: Psychologically biased Bayesian learning.
(i) We say an agent is optimistically biased if his posterior beliefs result from
an application of the optimistic Bayesian update rule (5) to a neo-additive
prior (1) such that the additive part of the posterior re￿ects rational Bayesian
learning in the sense of (8).
(ii) We say an agent is pessimistically biased if his posterior beliefs result from
an application of the pessimistic Bayesian update rule (6) to a neo-additive
prior (1) such that the additive part of the posterior re￿ects rational Bayesian
learning in the sense of (8).
Let us assume that an agent who receives information in the n-th trial, did also
receive information in the proceeding trials; that is, the events In, n = 1;2;::, form
a nested sequence I1 ￿ I2 ￿ ::: . As a consequence the corresponding sequence of
probabilities ￿ (I1);￿ (I2);::: is monotonically decreasing, implying the existence of a
unique limit point, i.e.,
lim
n!1￿ (In) = b 2 [0;￿ (I1)]. (10)
5A similar result obtains when the agent has a normally distributed prior over the mean of some
normal distribution (cf. Tonks 1983).
10Moreover, in the plausible case that the agent does not expect to collect new information
forever we have limn!1 ￿ (In) = 0. Because of (9) and (10) we obtain for the limit beliefs
of psychologically biased Bayesian learning:
Observation 2: Suppose A = 2 f?;￿g.
(i) If the agent is optimistically biased, then
lim
n!1￿
















(ii) If the agent is pessimistically biased, then
lim
n!1￿








(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿ (I1)




opt > 0 if and only if ￿ > 0 and ￿ > 0. Analogously, (1 ￿ ￿
pess) < 1 if
and only if ￿ > 0 and ￿ < 1.
Corollary: Suppose ￿￿ (A) 2 (0;1) and ￿ > 0.
(i) The posteriors of an optimistically biased agent with ￿ > 0 converge to some
belief strictly greater than the true probability ￿￿ (A). In particular, if
lim
n!1￿ (In) = 0,
then the agent￿ s posteriors converge to extreme optimism, i.e.,
lim
n!1￿
opt (A j In) = 1.
(ii) The posteriors of a pessimistically biased agent with ￿ < 1 converge to some
belief strictly greater than the true probability ￿￿ (A). If
lim
n!1￿ (In) = 0,
then the agent￿ s posteriors converge to extreme pessimism, i.e.,
lim
n!1￿
pess (A j In) = 0.
11The corollary demonstrates that psychologically biased Bayesian learning in our sense
violates the two standard paradigms of rational Bayesian learning. Firstly, the posterior
￿subjective￿beliefs do not converge to the ￿objective￿probabilities in an in￿nite learning
process. Secondly, the posteriors of two di⁄erent agents do not converge to the same
limit belief if they receive the same information but interpret it di⁄erently.
4 A ￿rst result: Identical information partitions
Throughout this paper we adopt Aumann￿ s (1976) original epistemic framework. We
consider two partitions P1 and P2 of a non-empty state-space ￿ which are interpreted
as the information space of agent 1, respectively 2. Denote by Pi (!), with i 2 f1;2g,
the member of Pi that contains ! 2 ￿. We say that i knows event A 2 B in state !
i⁄ Pi (!) ￿ A. Moreover, let P1 ^ P2 denote the ￿nest partition of B that is coarser
than P1 and P2 (i.e., the meet of P1 and P2). Following Aumann￿ s de￿nition, we say
that event A 2 B is common knowledge between agent 1 and 2 in state ! i⁄ P (!) ￿ A
whereby P (!) is the member of P1 ^ P2 containing ! 2 ￿.
Our ￿rst agreeing to disagree result considers the situation in which agents have
identical information partitions but apply di⁄erent update rules.
Proposition 1: Consider the following assumptions:
(A1) The agents have identical neo-additive priors, i.e., ￿1 = ￿2 ￿ ￿, such that
￿ > 0.
(A2) The agents have identical information partitions P1 = P2 6= f￿g.
(A3) Agent 1 is optimistically whereas agent 2 is pessimistically biased.
(A4) The agents￿posteriors are common knowledge in some state of the world
!￿ 2 ￿.
Then the agents￿posterior beliefs about any event A = 2 f?;￿g are di⁄erent.
Proof: Suppose that the posteriors are common-knowledge in !￿ 2 ￿. By assump-
tion, agent 1 is optimistically and agent 2 is pessimistically biased, implying
￿1 (A j P1 (!
￿)) = ￿
opt (A j P1 (!
￿))
￿2 (A j P2 (!
￿)) = ￿
pess (A j P2 (!
￿)).
12Moreover, P1 = P2 implies P1 = P2 = P1 ^ P2 so that P (!￿) = P1 (!￿) = P2 (!￿).
By inequality (7), the agents￿posteriors ￿1 (A j P (!￿)) and ￿2 (A j P (!￿)) are therefore
di⁄erent for every event A = 2 f?;￿g.￿
Proposition 1 shows that, except for degenerate cases, optimistically and pessimisti-
cally biased agents have in the ex-post situation always strict incentives to bet with each
other. By the corollary to observation 2, these incentives will get stronger the more in-
formation the agents collect. This result holds regardless of the fact whether the agents
collect identical or di⁄erent information.
While the formal proof of proposition 1 is simple, it reveals a fundamental di⁄erence
between Aumann￿ s concept of information and our approach. According to Aumann, any
di⁄erences in the beliefs of di⁄erent agents are caused by di⁄erent information received
by the agents. According to our approach, di⁄erences in the beliefs of agents may also
result because of di⁄erent psychological attitudes with respect to the interpretation of
new information. That is, while one agent might have a ￿half-full￿attitude, another
agent may have a ￿half-empty￿attitude when interpreting the same fact.
5 An illustrative example: Asset-trading
We illustrate proposition 1 by a simple example in which ex-post asset-trading happens
in every state of the world due to di⁄erent ex-post evaluations of the asset. Moreover,
these di⁄erent ex-post evaluations are common knowledge to the agents despite the fact
that their ex ante evaluations and their information partitions are identical.
Assume that agent 2 owns in period 1 a ￿nancial asset which gives vNM utility of 1
in case an investment project is successful and an utility of 0 in case it is not. Before it
will be revealed in period 3 whether the project is successful or not, there will be news
about the project￿ s progress, either good or bad, in period 2. Let the relevant state space
be given as
￿ = fSG;SB;FG;FBg
whereby the event G = fSG;FGg stands for good and the event B = fSB;FBg stands
for bad news in period 2. Accordingly, S = fSG;SBg is the event of success and F =
fFG;FBg is the event of failure. The information partitions P1 (t);P2 (t) , t 2 f1;2g,
in period t = 1 are
P1 (1) = P2 (1) = f￿g.
Under the assumption of identical neo-additive priors ￿1 = ￿2 = ￿, both agents therefore
(ex-ante) evaluate the Savage-act f of holding the asset by the same CEU (2), namely,
13CEU1 (f;￿) = CEU2 (f;￿) = ￿ ￿ ￿ + (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿ (S).
As a consequence, there is no strict incentive for the agents to trade the asset in the
ex-ante situation.
Consider now the following information partitions at period 2
P1 (2) = P2 (2) = ffSG;FGg;fSB;FBgg
and assume that agent 1 applies optimistically and agent 2 applies pessimistically biased
Bayesian learning upon learning the news x 2 fG;Bg. Agent 1, resp. 2, then evaluate




opt (￿ j x)
￿
= ￿
opt (S j x),
resp.
CEU2 (f;￿
pess (￿ j x)) = ￿
pess (S j x).
By (7), we have for ￿;￿ 2 (0;1)
CEU2 (f;￿
pess (￿ j x)) < ￿ (S j x) < CEU1
￿
f;￿
opt (￿ j x)
￿
.
Thus, regardless of whether the news turn out good or bad agent 1 ex-post evaluates
the asset strictly higher than agent 2. As a consequence there will be ex-post trade
in the asset in every state of the world. For example, at price ￿ (S j x) agent 2 would
strictly prefer to sell the asset while agent 1 would strictly prefer to buy it.
Remark. Observe that if both agents were EU decision makers, i.e., ￿ = 0, there
would be no strict incentive for ex-post trading if there is no strict incentive for ex-ante
trading. As this example shows, this is not necessarily true for CEU decision makers
because of the possibility of dynamically inconsistent CEU preferences.6 According to
our concept of psychologically biased Bayesian learning, the incentive for ex-post trading
results in the example from the agents￿di⁄erent psychological attitudes with respect to
the interpretation of new information.
6Ludwig and Zimper (2006b) demonstrate that sophisticated (Strotz 1956, Pollak 1968) CEU decision
makers may have even stronger incentives for intrapersonal commitment than sophisticated hyperbolic
discounting decision makers in the sense of Laibson (1997) and Frederick, Loewenstein, and O￿ Donoghue
(2002).
146 A second result: Identical learning rules
Our second agreeing to disagree result applies to people who use the same psychologically
biased learning rule but have di⁄erent information partitions.
Proposition 2: Consider the following assumptions:
(A1￿ ) The agents have identical neo-additive priors, i.e., ￿1 = ￿2 ￿ ￿, such that
￿ > 1.
(A2￿ ) Both agents are either optimistically or pessimistically biased.
(A3￿ ) The agents￿posteriors are common-knowledge in some state of the world
!￿ 2 ￿.
(A4￿ ) The agents￿priors satisfy ￿ (P1 (!￿)) 6= ￿ (P2 (!￿)) whereby P1 (!￿);P2 (!￿) 6=
￿.
Then the agents￿posterior beliefs about any event A = 2 f?;￿g are di⁄erent.
Observe that assumption (A4￿ ), i.e., ￿ (P1 (!￿)) 6= ￿ (P2 (!￿)), cannot hold if the
agents have identical priors and identical information partitions. That is, the result of
proposition 2 only applies in situations of asymmetric information, i.e., P1 6= P2, such
that the two events P1 (!￿) and P2 (!￿) are not equally likely according to the agents￿
common prior.
Before we turn to the proof of proposition 2 consider the following example which
illustrates the intuition behind our formal proof.
Example. Consider the following information structure
















P1 ^ P2 = ff!1;!2;!3;!4g;:::g.
Suppose agent 1 and 2 have a common neo-additive prior ￿ with ￿ 2 (0;1) such that
￿ (f!1g) = ::: = ￿ (f!4g) > 0.

























































￿ ￿ ￿ + (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿ (f!1;!2;!3;!4g)
.
Observe that the posterior of each agent is the same in every state belonging to P (!￿) 2
P1 ^ P2 with !￿ 2 f!1;!2;!3;!4g so that we can stipulate that the agents￿posteriors
are common knowledge in every state !￿ 2 f!1;!2;!3;!4g. Since ￿ > 0, the posteriors






￿ (f!1;!2g) = ￿ (f!1;!2;!3;!4g) ,
￿ (P1 (!
￿)) = ￿ (P2 (!
￿)),
which is not the case in this example. Thus, despite identical priors and identical
Bayesian learning rules, both agents have di⁄erent posterior beliefs which are common
knowledge.
Proof of proposition 2. Our proof builds on Aumann￿ s (1976) original proof for
the case of an additive probability measure, i.e., ￿ = 0.
Step 1. Aumann (1976): For an additive common prior ￿ the agents￿posteriors
must be identical when they are common knowledge at some state of the world.
Suppose to the contrary that there is some !￿ 2 ￿ in which it is common knowledge
that
￿1 (A j P1 (!
￿)) = q1 and ￿2 (A j P2 (!
￿)) = q2










1 ￿ P (!￿) whereby P (!￿) is the member of P1 ^ P2 containing !￿. Denote by
P 1
1;:::;P n
1 the members of P1 such that
P
1
1 [ ::: [ P
n
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n























￿ , j = 1;::;n
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￿ (A \ P (!￿))
q1
= ￿ (P (!
￿)).
An analogous argument for agent 2 results in
￿ (A \ P (!￿))
q2
= ￿ (P (!
￿))
implying the desired result q1 = q2.￿
Step 2. Consider now the case of identical non-additive priors (1), i.e., ￿ > 0. Let
A = 2 f?;￿g and suppose both agents are optimistically biased; (there is an analogous
argument for pessimistically biased agents). Then, for ! 2 ￿,
￿
opt
































￿ ￿ ￿ + (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿ (P2 (!))
:
17Assume now that the posteriors (15) and (16) are common knowledge in some state
!￿ 2 ￿. By the argument of step 1, the posteriors must coincide for the special case of
￿ = 0. We therefore have for the additive part of the posteriors
￿ (A j P1 (!
￿)) = ￿ (A j P2 (!
￿)),







￿)) 6= ￿ (P2 (!
￿)) ,
￿ (P1 (!
￿)) 6= ￿ (P2 (!
￿)).
This proves the proposition. ￿￿
7 Concluding remarks
In a ￿rst step, we have developed a model of psychologically biased Bayesian learning
whereby we focus on the two benchmark cases of optimistically, resp. pessimistically,
biased learning. While our model encompasses the standard model of rational Bayesian
learning as a special case, it additionally allows for the possibility that an agent exhibits
a ￿myside bias￿in the interpretation of new information.
In a second step, we apply our model of psychologically biased Bayesian learning to
the epistemic situation studied in Aumann (1976). Two main results emerge:
1. Even if people receive the same information, they may agree to disagree if their
psychologically attitudes about the interpretation of new information are di⁄erent.
2. Even if people have the same psychologically attitudes, they may agree to disagree
if they receive di⁄erent information.
Both results are in contrast to Aumann￿ s famous conclusion that agents cannot agree
to disagree regardless of whether they receive the same information or not. Our concept
of psychologically biased Bayesian learning can therefore o⁄er a possible explanation for
the existence of ex-post trade in ￿nancial assets.
18Appendix
Proof of observation 1:
Applying the optimistic Bayesian update rule to a neo-additive capacity gives, for
A = 2 f?;￿g,
￿ (A j B) =
￿ ￿ ￿ + (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿ (A \ B)
￿ ￿ ￿ + (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿ (B)
=
￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ + (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿ (B)
+
(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿ (B)
￿ ￿ ￿ + (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿ (B)















￿ ￿ ￿ + (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿ (B)
.
Applying the pessimistic Bayesian update rule to a neo-additive capacity gives, for
A = 2 f?;￿g,
￿
pess (A j B) =
￿ (A [ :B) ￿ ￿ (:B)
1 ￿ ￿ (:B)
=
￿ ￿ ￿ + (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿ (A [ :B) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿ (:B)
1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿ (:B)
=
(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿ (A)
1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ (￿ (:B))
￿
(1 ￿ ￿)￿ (A \ :B)
1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ (￿ (:B))
=
(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿ (A)
1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ (￿ (:B))
￿
(1 ￿ ￿)￿ (:B)
1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ (￿ (:B))
￿ (A j :B)
=
(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿ (A)
1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ (￿ (:B))
￿
(1 ￿ ￿)￿ (:B)
1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ (￿ (:B))
￿




(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿ (B)
￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) + (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿ (B)
￿ ￿ (A j B)
= (1 ￿ ￿
pess





￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)




Anscombe, F.J, and R.J. Aumann (1963), ￿A De￿nition of Subjective Probability￿ ,
Annals of American Statistics 34, 199-205.
Aumann, R. (1976), ￿Agreeing to disagree,￿Annals of Statistics 4, 1236-1239.
Bacharach, M. (1985), ￿Some Extension of a Claim of Aumann in an Axiomatic Model
of Knowledge￿ , Journal of Economic Theory 37, 167￿ 190.
Baron, J. (2000), Thinking and Deciding, Cambridge University Press: New York,
Melbourne, Madrid.
Beck, A.T. (1976), Cognitive Therapy and the Emotional Disorders, International Uni-
versities Press: New York.
Berger, J., and L.M. Berliner (1986), ￿Robust Bayes and Empirical Bayes Analysis
with "-Contaminated Priors￿ , Annals of Statistics 14, 461-486.
Bonanno, G., and K. Nehring (1999), ￿How to Make Sense of the Common Prior As-
sumption under Incomplete Information￿ , International Journal of Game Theory
28, 409-434.
Chateauneuf, A., Eichberger, J., and S. Grant (2006), ￿Choice under Uncertainty with
the Best and Worst in Mind: Neo-additive Capacities￿ , Journal of Economic The-
ory forthcoming.
Dow, J., Madrigal, V., and S.R. Werlang (1990), ￿Preferences, Common Knowledge,
and Speculative Trade￿ , mimeo
Eichberger, J., and D. Kelsey (1999), ￿E-Capacities and the Ellsberg Paradox￿ , Theory
and Decision 46, 107-140.
Eichberger, J., Grant, S., and D. Kelsey (2006), ￿Updating Choquet Expected Utility
Preferences￿ , mimeo
Ellsberg, D. (1961), ￿Risk, Ambiguity and the Savage Axioms￿ , Quarterly Journal of
Economics 75, 643-669.
Epstein, L.G. (1999), ￿A De￿nition of Uncertainty Aversion￿ , The Review of Economic
Studies 66, 579-608.
Epstein, L.G. and M. Le Breton (1993), ￿Dynamically Consistent Beliefs Must Be
Bayesian￿ , Journal of Economic Theory 61, 1-22.
20Frederick, S., Loewenstein, G., and T. O￿ Donoghue (2002), ￿Time Discounting and
Time Preference: A Critical Review￿ , Journal of Economic Literature Vol. XL,
351-401.
Geanakoplos, J. (1992), ￿Common Knowledge￿ , Journal of Economic Perspectives 6,
53￿ 82.
Ghirardato, P., and M. Marinacci (2002), ￿Ambiguity Made Precise: A Comparative
Foundation￿ , Journal of Economic Theory 102, 251￿ 289.
Ghirardato, P., Klibano⁄, P., and M. Marinacci (1998), ￿Additivity with Multiple
Priors￿ , Journal of Mathematical Economics 30, 405-420.
Ghirardato, P., Maccheroni, F., and M. Marinacci (2004), ￿Di⁄erentiating Ambiguity
and Ambiguity Attitude￿ , Journal of Economic Theory 118, 133-173.
Gilboa, I. (1987), ￿Expected Utility with Purely Subjective Non-Additive Probabili-
ties￿ , Journal of Mathematical Economics 16, 65-88.
Gilboa, I., and D. Schmeidler (1993), ￿Updating Ambiguous Beliefs￿ , Journal of Eco-
nomic Theory 59, 33-49.
Halevy, Y. (1998), ￿Trade between Rational Agents as a Result of Asymmetric Infor-
mation￿ , mimeo.
Halevy, Y. (2004), ￿The Possibility of Speculative Trade between Dynamically Consis-
tent Agents￿ , Games and Economic Behavior 46, 189-198.
Harsanyi, J.C. (1967), ￿Games with Incomplete Information Played by ￿ Bayesian￿Play-
ers. Part I: The Basic Model￿ , Management Science 14, 159-182.
Kahneman, D., and A. Tversky (1979), ￿Prospect theory: An Analysis of Decision
under Risk￿ , Econometrica 47, 263-291.
Laibson, D. (1997), ￿Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting￿ , Quarterly Journal of
Economics 112, 443-477.
Lord, C.G., Ross, L., and M.R. Lepper (1979), ￿Biased Assimilation and Attitude
Polarization: The E⁄ects of Prior Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence￿ ,
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 37, 2098-2109.
Ludwig, A., and A. Zimper (2006a), ￿Rational Expectations and Ambiguity: A Com-
ment on Abel (2002)￿ , Economics Bulletin, 4(2), 1-15.
21Ludwig, A., and A. Zimper (2006b), ￿Investment Behavior under Ambiguity: The Case
of Pessimistic Decision Makers,￿Mathematical Social Sciences 52, 111-130.
Milgrom, P. (1981), ￿An Axiomatic Characterization of Common Knowledge￿ , Econo-
metrica 49, 219-222.
Milgrom, P., and N. Stockey (1982), ￿Information, Trade and Common Knowledge￿ ,
Journal of Economic Theory 26, 17-27.
Morris, S. (1994), ￿Trade with Heterogeneous Prior Beliefs and Asymmetric Informa-
tion￿ , Econometrica 62, 1327-1347.
Neeman, Z. (1996), ￿Approximating Agreeing to Disagree Results with Common p-
Beliefs￿ , Games and Economic Behavior 16, 77-96.
Pitz, G.F. (1969), ￿An Inertia E⁄ect (Resistance to Change) in the Revision of Opin-
ion￿ , Canadian Journal of Psychology 23, 24-33.
Pitz, G.F., Downing, L., and H. Reinhold (1967), ￿Sequential E⁄ects in the Revision
of Subjective Probabilities￿ , Canadian Journal of Psychology 21, 381-393.
Pollak, R.A. (1968), ￿Consistent Planning￿ , The Review of Economic Studies 35, 201-
208.
Quiggin, J.P. (1981), ￿Risk Perception and Risk Aversion among Australian Farmers￿ ,
Australian Journal of Agricultural Economics 25, 160-169.
Quiggin, J.P. (1982), ￿A Theory of Anticipated Utility￿ , Journal of Economic Behavior
and Organization 3, 323-343.
Rubinstein, A., and A. Wollinski (1990), ￿On the Logic of ￿Agreeing to Disagree￿Type
Results￿ , Journal of Economic Theory 51, 184-193.
Samet, D. (1990), ￿Ignoring Ignorance and Agreeing to Disagree￿ , Journal of Economic
Theory 52, 190-207.
Sarin, R., and P.P. Wakker (1992), ￿A Simple Axiomatization of Nonadditive Expected
Utility￿ , Econometrica 60, 1255-1272.
Sarin, R., and P.P. Wakker (1998a), ￿Revealed Likelihood and Knightian Uncertainty￿ ,
Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 16, 223-250.
Savage, L.J. (1954), The Foundations of Statistics, John Wiley and & Sons, Inc.: New
York, London, Sydney.
22Schmeidler, D. (1986), ￿Integral Representation without Additivity￿ , Proceedings of
the American Mathematical Society 97, 255-261.
Schmeidler, D. (1989), ￿Subjective Probability and Expected Utility without Additiv-
ity￿ , Econometrica 57, 571-587.
Siniscalchi, M. (2001), ￿Bayesian Updating for General Maxmin Expected Utility Pref-
erences￿ , mimeo.
Siniscalchi, M. (2005), ￿A Behavioral Characterization of Plausible Priors￿ , Journal of
Economic Theory, forthcoming.
Siniscalchi, M. (2006), ￿Dynamic Choice under Ambiguity￿ , mimeo.
Strotz, R.H. (1956), ￿Myopia and Inconsistency in Dynamic Utility Maximization￿ ,
The Review of Economic Studies 23, 165-180.
Tonks, I. (1983), ￿Bayesian Learning and the Optimal Investment Decision of the
Firm￿ , The Economic Journal 93, 87-98.
Tversky, A., and D. Kahneman (1992), ￿Advances in Prospect Theory: Cumulative
Representations of Uncertainty￿ , Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 5, 297-323.
Tversky, A., and P.P. Wakker (1995), ￿Risk Attitudes and Decision Weights￿ , Econo-
metrica 63, 1255-1280.
Viscusi, W. K. (1985). A Bayesian Perspective on Biases in Risk Perception. Economics
Letters 17, 59{62.
Viscusi, W. K., and C.J. O￿ Connor (1984), ￿Adaptive Responses to Chemical Labeling:
Are Workers Bayesian Decision Makers?￿ , The American Economic Review 74,
942-956.
Wakker, P.P. (2001), ￿Testing and Characterizing Properties of Nonadditive Measures
through Violations of the Sure-Thing Principle￿ , Econometrica 69, 1039-1059.
Wakker, P.P (2004), ￿On the Composition of Risk Preference and Belief￿ , Psychological
Review 111, 236-241.
Wakker, P.P, and A. Tversky (1993), ￿An Axiomatization of Cumulative Prospect
Theory￿ , Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 7, 147-176.
Yaari, M.E. (1987), ￿The Dual Theory of Choice under Risk￿ , Econometrica 55, 95-
115.
23